The Nigerian Supreme Court clarifies that where the Federal High Court wrongly assumes jurisdiction in an employment dispute, the appellate courts may transfer the matter to the National Industrial Court under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act – W.A.E.C. v. Folorunsho (2025) 17 NWLR (Pt. 2014) 283.
Facts
The respondent, who was a long serving employee of the appellant, challenged the appellant’s refusal to place him on pension following the termination of his employment. He commenced an action at the Federal High Court seeking declaratory and monetary reliefs relating to his alleged pension entitlement. The trial court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal and entered judgment in his favour. Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction under section 251(1)(p) of the Constitution because the appellant is not an agency of the Federal Government. In response, the respondent argued that even if jurisdiction was lacking, the Supreme Court should invoke its powers under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act to transfer the matter to the National Industrial Court, which is the court constitutionally vested with jurisdiction over labour and employment matters.
Issue
Whether, having regard to section 251(1)(p) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, the Federal High Court possessed jurisdiction to entertain a suit arising from the refusal of the appellant to pay the respondent pension benefits.
Decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s employment-related claims. The Court reasoned that the appellant, the West African Examinations Council, is not an agency of the Federal Government within the meaning of section 251(1)(p) and that claims relating to pensions, employment and labour falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court pursuant to sections 254C and 254D of the Constitution.
The Court further considered the proper order to make where the Federal High Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Relying on section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act, the Supreme Court affirmed that where the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction, it ought to transfer the matter to the court with appropriate jurisdiction rather than striking it out.
Invoking its own powers under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act which enables the Supreme Court to make any order a court of first instance could make, the apex court held that it was competent to make a consequential order of transfer to the National Industrial Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court transferred the case to the National Industrial Court, being the court with requisite jurisdiction over the dispute.
Commentary
In September 2025, we considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Usman v. Nigeria Unity Line Plc [2025] 15 NWLR (Pt. 2008) 267, in our case alert titled Jurisdiction and Transfer of Cases: Did the Supreme Court Render Section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act Otiose? In that alert, we observed that the Court’s reasoning appeared to disable the Federal High Court from exercising its express statutory power of transfer under section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act where it lacked jurisdiction. We further noted that this reasoning created an internal inconsistency within the jurisprudence on transfer because earlier cases had affirmed that the Federal High Court retains the power to transfer where it takes the view that it lacks jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court can, in the exercise of its powers under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, assume the position of the trial court and order a transfer to the court properly vested with jurisdiction.
In our opinion, the decision in W.A.E.C v. Folorunsho represents the correct position of the law and is fully aligned with the established authorities of the appellate courts. It affirms that the power of transfer contained in section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act is triggered precisely when the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction and that the Supreme Court, acting under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, is in as good a position as the trial court to order such a transfer to the appropriate court competent to entertain the matter. The Court of Appeal similarly possesses derivative authority to do so under section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act. It is our opinion that by restoring the statutory logic of section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act, this decision meaningfully clarifies the confusion created by the reading of Usman’s case.
We further note that while the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule the Usman decision, the present judgment stands as the authoritative statement of the law on the point. Under the doctrinal rule that where two Supreme Court decisions are in conflict the later decision prevails, Folorunsho’s case now provides the governing principle for courts and practitioners.
The decision therefore brings welcome clarity to an important procedural question with significant implications for jurisdictional practice, particularly in employment and commercial disputes where jurisdictional errors are not uncommon. It also reinforces a pragmatic judicial attitude that prefers transferring cases to the appropriate court over striking them out and thereby promotes substantive justice by avoiding unnecessary delays and procedural technicalities.