The Nigerian Supreme Court holds that the Federal High Court lacks the powers to order the transfer of cases to the State High Court where it lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the suit – Usman v. Nig. Unity Line Plc [2025] 15 NWLR (Pt. 2008) 267.
Facts
The claimant filed a motion ex parte at the Federal High Court, Kaduna, seeking leave for his claim of unpaid legal professional fees of ₦34,172,839.60 to be placed on the undefended list, which leave was granted. Despite several hearing dates, the respondent failed to file a notice of intention to defend the suit. The trial court, satisfied that the respondent had no intention to defend, entered judgment in favour of the claimant. Dissatisfied, the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a suit with respect to unpaid professional fees, and consequently struck out the suit. Dissatisfied, the claimant further appealed to the Supreme Court and urged the court to set aside the order of the Court of Appeal striking out his suit. The claimant also urged the Supreme Court to invoke section 22 of the Supreme Court Act and transfer his claim to the High Court of Kaduna State for hearing.
Issues for Determination
- Whether, having regard to section 251(1)(p) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s case.
- Whether, if the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the appellant’s suit, the Court of Appeal was right in refusing or failing to transfer the suit to the appropriate court.
Decision of the Supreme Court
On the first issue, the Court held that the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. The subject matter of the suit was for the recovery of professional fees for legal services which arose from a simple contract. The Apex Court further held that section 16(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act expressly confers jurisdiction on the State High Court in matters with respect to the recovery of legal fees. It further held that by the Appellant’s own admission, the Respondent is a public limited liability company, and not an agency of the Federal Government.
On the second issue, the Court reasoned that the powers of the Court of Appeal under section 15 of its enabling Act are limited to making such orders as the court of first instance could legally have made and that since the Federal High Court had acted without jurisdiction, it could not have made an order of transfer. Consequently, the Court of Appeal was equally without jurisdiction to do so.
Turning to the invitation to invoke section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, the Court noted that while section 22 empowers the Supreme Court to exercise the full jurisdiction as if it is the court of first instance, including powers to rehear matters, or make orders that the lower courts ought to have made, the power does not extend to correcting counsel’s errors or assisting a party to prove a case that was wrongly initiated.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court held that since the Federal High Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Court of Appeal was right to strike out the matter, such that no order of transfer could be made.
Commentary
We agree with the Supreme Court’s decision that the Federal High Court (FHC) lacks jurisdiction over disputes concerning the recovery of legal fees. Such matters properly lie within the jurisdiction of the State High Court.
We, however, respectfully differ from the impression created by the Court, that the admission of parties is a relevant consideration in resolving what is clearly an issue of law, as the admission of parties is not a relevant consideration in determining subject matter jurisdiction. This is because the law is long settled that the acquiesce, admission or consent of parties cannot ripen into conferring jurisdiction on the court.
On the important issue of the power of the Federal High Court to transfer matters in respect of which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court’s reasoning did provide sufficient justification for the conclusion that the Court of Appeal lacked the ability to issue an order transferring the suit to the appropriate court by exercising the power that inures to the Federal High Court pursuant to section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act.
The Court correctly reasoned that, by virtue of section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act, the Court of Appeal may only make orders which the trial court could have lawfully made but failed to make. However, the Court’s conclusion that the Court of Appeal could not make an order of transfer because the Federal High Court acted without jurisdiction appears non sequitur, as the real question was whether the Federal High Court is empowered under section 22(2) of its enabling Act to transfer a matter where it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. We note that an order of transfer under section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act presupposes that the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction, and it is precisely in those circumstances that the statute empowers the Court to transfer the matter to the appropriate court with jurisdiction. By suggesting otherwise, the Supreme Court’s decision may be read as implicitly disabling the Federal High Court from exercising its statutory powers of transfer, on the premise that it lacks jurisdiction. This creates a catch-22 situation.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court itself has, in earlier decisions, affirmed the power of the Federal High Court to transfer cases to the State High Court under section 22(2). For instance, in Dec Oil and Gas Ltd v Shell Nig. Gas Ltd [2019] 14 NWLR (Pt. 1692) 273, the Court recognised the provision as a valid saving provision.
It may be thought that the decision of the apex court in the present case may have been influenced by the fact that the Federal High Court had not only assumed jurisdiction but had delivered a judgement. However, in Maigana v. I.T.F. [2021] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1777) 1, the Supreme Court upheld the power of the Federal High Court to transfer matters notwithstanding that the trial judge had wrongly assumed jurisdiction and even delivered judgment. The Court held that nothing in section 22(2) suggests that a transfer is foreclosed merely because the case has been wrongly adjudicated to conclusion. Thus, the present decision risks being regarded as having been delivered per incuriam.
The consequence is the creation of judicial conflict on the scope of the Federal High Court’s transfer powers under section 22(2) of the Federal High Court Act. We note that this conflict will likely generate uncertainty for litigants and counsel, particularly in commercial disputes where jurisdictional missteps are not uncommon.