Case Alert
Supreme Court Strikes Out Multi-State Suit Challenging Rivers State Emergency Proclamation and Defines the Constitutional Parameters for Emergency Declarations and Temporary Suspension of Elected State Institutions under Nigerian Federalism – AG Adamawa State & Ors. v AG Fed & Anor. – SC/CV/329/2025
Introduction
On 15.12.2025, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in an action instituted by the Attorneys-General of Adamawa State and nine other states challenging the declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The suit raised far-reaching constitutional questions concerning the scope of the President’s emergency powers under section 305 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (as amended) (“the Constitution”), including the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and House of Assembly of Rivers State, the appointment of a Sole Administrator, and the approval of the proclamation by the National Assembly.
In a considered judgment, the Supreme Court struck out the suit, holding that the action was incompetent and that its original jurisdiction had not been properly invoked. Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to make important pronouncements on the constitutional framework governing the declaration and operation of a state of emergency.
This case alert reviews the background to the dispute, analyses the reasoning of the Court, situates the decision within the broader trajectory of Nigerian emergency-powers jurisprudence, and highlights its constitutional significance.
Brief Facts
On 18.03.2025, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria proclaimed a state of emergency in Rivers State pursuant to section 305 of the Constitution. Consequential steps followed, including the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and House of Assembly of the State, and the appointment of a Sole Administrator to oversee the administration of Rivers State during the emergency period. The proclamation was subsequently laid before and approved by the National Assembly.
In reaction, the Attorneys-General of Adamawa, Akwa Ibom, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Enugu, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Taraba, and Zamfara States commenced an action before the Supreme Court against the Attorney-General of the Federation and the National Assembly. Relying on the Court’s original jurisdiction under section 232(1) of the Constitution, the Plaintiffs sought, among other reliefs, declarations that the proclamation of a state of emergency in Rivers State, the suspension of elected state officials, the appointment of a Sole Administrator, and the approval of the proclamation by the National Assembly were unconstitutional.
The Plaintiffs further sought injunctive reliefs restraining the Defendants from taking similar steps in relation to their respective States. The Defendants opposed the claims and raised preliminary objections challenging, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Plaintiffs’ locus standi, and the competence of the action.
Decision of the Supreme Court
In determining whether its original jurisdiction had been validly invoked, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled conditions that must co-exist under section 232(1) of the Constitution to wit: that: (x) there must be a dispute between the Federation and a State or States, or between States; (y) the dispute must involve a question of law or fact; and (z) the dispute must concern the existence or extent of a legal right.
Applying these criteria, the Court found that none of the Plaintiff States was Rivers State, nor did any of them demonstrate authority to litigate on behalf of Rivers State. The Court further observed that there was no evidence that a state of emergency had been declared in any of the Plaintiff States, or that any concrete step had been taken by the Federation against them pursuant to section 305 of the Constitution.
The Plaintiffs’ reliance on an alleged statement attributed to the Attorney-General of the Federation at a media briefing, which they construed as a threat of similar action against their States, was rejected. The Court held that such a statement, without more, could not amount to an actionable conduct of the Federation capable of grounding a dispute under section 232(1). Complaints directed at the statements or actions of federal officials or functionaries, the Court emphasised, do not, without more, translate into disputes between the Federation and a State for constitutional purposes.
In the absence of a justiciable dispute disclosing the existence or extent of a legal right as between the Plaintiffs and the Federation, the Supreme Court held that its original jurisdiction had not been properly invoked. The action was accordingly declared incompetent and struck out.
Notwithstanding its finding that the suit was incompetent, the Supreme Court proceeded, in view of the constitutional importance of the issues raised, to make considered observations on the proper construction and application of section 305 of the Constitution.
In substance, the Court stated that a proclamation of a state of emergency issued pursuant to section 305 of the Constitution, including consequential measures such as the temporary suspension of elected state institutions is constitutionally permissible where it is strictly grounded in the conditions stipulated by the Constitution, duly laid before and affirmed by the National Assembly by the requisite two-thirds majority of all the members of each House, acting in accordance with their Standing Orders, and implemented on a temporary and proportionate basis for the overriding purpose of restoring constitutional order. The Court underscored that the extraordinary nature of emergency powers demands scrupulous fidelity to constitutional safeguards, particularly legislative approval, temporal limitation, and proportionality.
The Court further situated its interpretation of section 305 within a broader comparative constitutional context. It made reference to emergency-powers regimes in other federal constitutions, including India, noting that while such constitutions often contain express textual provisions detailing the scope of emergency rule, the Nigerian Constitution adopts a distinct drafting approach. According to the Court, section 305 was deliberately framed to preserve the federal character of the Nigerian polity by conditioning the exercise of emergency powers on collective constitutional controls, most notably the supervisory and approving role of the National Assembly. The Court explained that this structural design does not denude the President of the authority necessary to respond decisively to grave threats to constitutional order, but rather embeds that authority within a framework intended to prevent permanence, arbitrariness, or the erosion of federalism.
Commentary
This decision reinforces the principled limits of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction and affirms the long-standing position that litigation is not an arena for hypothetical, speculative, or anticipatory grievances. The Court’s insistence on a concrete and live dispute between proper parties reflects a consistent jurisprudential commitment to constitutional structure, federal balance, and the proper role of the judiciary.
The Supreme Court examined the identity and standing of the Plaintiffs who sought to invoke its original jurisdiction. None of the Plaintiff States was Rivers State, nor was any shown to possess authority to litigate on its behalf, and no actionable legal injury was demonstrated to have accrued to the Plaintiffs themselves. The decision accordingly underscores that recourse to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is conditioned not merely on the constitutional importance of the subject matter, but on the presence of proper parties and a dispute that discloses the existence or extent of a legal right amenable to judicial determination.
Beyond the jurisdictional holding, the decision is notable for the clarity it brings to the constitutional discourse on emergency powers. Historically, the Supreme Court has had limited opportunity to pronounce definitively on the substantive legality of emergency proclamations under section 305, often being constrained by procedural or jurisdictional obstacles. This difficulty was poignantly illustrated in Plateau State v. Attorney-General of the Federation [2006] 3 NWLR (Pt. 967) 346, where members of a full panel of the Court expressed regret at being unable to adjudicate on the merits of a case implicating emergency powers, notwithstanding their recognition that such matters are neither academic nor speculative, but raise serious and far-reaching constitutional questions touching on democratic governance.
Against that jurisprudential backdrop, the findings made in the present case assume particular significance. Although the suit was struck out for want of jurisdiction, the Court articulated, in clear and authoritative terms, the constitutional architecture governing the exercise of emergency powers under section 305. The Court recognised the discretionary authority vested in the President to determine the nature and scope of measures required to address the exigencies of each particular emergency, while emphasising that such discretion is neither unbounded nor self-executing. Rather, it is constitutionally mediated through institutional safeguards, including legislative approval by the National Assembly through the prescribed super-majority, the temporary and proportionate character of the measures adopted, and their orientation towards the restoration of constitutional order, with the legality of such measures remaining ultimately subject to judicial scrutiny.
These pronouncements, though made outside a binding determination on the merits, nonetheless represent an important exposition of constitutional principle. They provide guidance to political actors, courts, and litigants alike, and mark a meaningful contribution to a body of jurisprudence that has, until now, developed cautiously in this sensitive area.
It bears noting that the judgment was delivered by a split panel of the Supreme Court, with six Justices forming the majority and one dissenting. Given the constitutional issues engaged by the dissenting judgment, a further review will follow, examining its reasoning and implications within the evolving jurisprudence on emergency powers and federalism.