Introduction
On 16.05.2025, the Supreme Court (SC) delivered its judgment in the appeal filed by Chief Solomon Owoniyi (the Appellant), arising from a chieftaincy dispute over the Obaro of Kabba stool. The High Court of Kogi State (the Trial Court) had dismissed the suit as statute-barred, but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision. In a unanimous judgment delivered by Ogunwumiju, J.S.C., the SC dismissed the appeal, affirming that the action was not statute-barred. Significantly, Abiru, J.S.C., in a concurring opinion, strongly rebuked the Trial Court for its disregard of binding SC precedents on the same issue.
Factual Matrix
The 1st – 4th Respondents (as Claimants) instituted an action on 17.09.2018 at the High Court of Kogi State against the Appellant and the 5th and 6th Respondents (as the 1st to 3rd Defendants respectively), challenging the appointment, approval, and recognition of the Appellant as the Obaro of Kabba. The appointment of the Appellant had been approved by the 5th Respondent vide a letter dated 19.07.2018, pursuant to the Obaro of Kabba (Filling of Chieftaincy Vacancy, Declaration of Indigenes of Kabba/Owe Land, Guidelines for the Rotation of Ololu Titles and Other Miscellaneous Provisions) Edict No. 12 of Kogi State, 1995 (the Chieftaincy Edict).
The Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) challenging the jurisdiction of the Trial Court on two grounds (x) that the suit was premature for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as prescribed under section 6(1) of the Chiefs (Appointment, Deposition and Establishment of Traditional Councils) Law of Kogi State, 2006 (the Chiefs Law); and (y) that the action was statute-barred by virtue of section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law of Kwara State (as applicable in Kogi State) and section 18 of the Limitation Law of Kwara State (as applicable in Kogi State).
In response, the Claimants contended that the Chieftaincy Edict was in abeyance until the 5th Respondent took steps and initiated the processes leading to the appointment of the Appellant as the Obaro of Kabba, and that they were therefore not estopped from challenging the appointment.
Upon hearing the NPO, the Trial Court upheld the objection on the second ground and dismissed the suit on the basis that it was statute-barred. The Trial Court held that the Claimants’ cause of action arose in 1995 when the Chieftaincy Edict was promulgated, and not in 2018 when the Appellant was appointed.
Dissatisfied, the 1st – 4th Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal, while the Appellant filed a cross-appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the action as constituted was not statute-barred, and dismissed the cross-appeal.
Still dissatisfied, the Appellant lodged a final appeal to the SC.
Issues for Determination
The SC considered three key issues:
- Whether the lower court was wrong in holding that the suit was not statute-barred.
- Whether the 1st to 4th respondents complied with section 6(1) of the Chiefs Law before filing the suit.
- Whether the 1st to 4th respondents had the locus standi to institute the action.
The focus of this review is the central question of whether the action was statute-barred.
The Judgment of the Supreme Court
The SC held that the cause of action did not crystallise until 2018, when the 5th respondent appointed the Appellant as the Obaro of Kabba pursuant to the Obaro of Kabba (Filling of Chieftaincy Vacancy, Declaration of Indigenes of Kabba/Owe Land, Guidelines for the Rotation of Ololu Titles and Other Miscellaneous Provisions) Edict No. 12 of Kogi State, 1995. The SC reasoned that although the Chieftaincy Edict was promulgated in 1995, it lay in abeyance and only became relevant in 2018 when the stool of the Obaro of Kabba became vacant and the Edict was invoked to fill the vacancy. At that point, a definite injury occurred to the 1st – 4th respondents, giving rise to a complete cause of action.
The apex court reiterated the settled principle that the period of limitation begins to run only when a cause of action arises. Relying on its earlier decision in Esuwoye v. Bosere & Ors. [2017] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) Pg. 256 at Pg. 298 – 299, the SC affirmed that a law or declaration relating to chieftaincy does not give rise to an actionable wrong until it is invoked to fill a vacancy that directly affects the claimant’s rights.
Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court’s view that the cause of action accrued in 1995 upon the promulgation of the Edict was contrary to established judicial precedents, which it was bound to follow under the doctrine of stare decisis. Since the appointment was made on 19.07.2018 and the action was instituted on 17.09.2018, the Court held that the suit, having been filed about two months after the accrual of the cause of action, was not statute-barred.
In his concurring opinion, Abiru, J.S.C., delivered a strong rebuke of both the trial judge and counsel to the appellant for their blatant disregard of binding precedents. His Lordship observed that the entire controversy over whether the action was statute-barred “would have been avoided” had the learned trial judge and counsel to the appellant “made an effort to read and understand and/or been honest with their understanding” of earlier SC decisions in Ikine v. Edjerode [2001] 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446 and Esuwoye v. Bosere & Ors. [2017] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 256.
His Lordship noted that Esuwoye v. Bosere & Ors concerned facts, same as those in the present case, where the SC had held that a cause of action in chieftaincy matters only accrues when the relevant declaration is invoked to fill a vacancy. Despite both authorities being cited to the trial court, they were “ignored and discountenanced… for very flimsy reasons.” His Lordship described this as “a clear case of judicial impertinence and judicial rascality,” lamenting that such failure to adhere to the doctrine of judicial precedent, likely abetted by counsel’s “selfish and self-centred reasons”, had resulted in the waste of seven years of judicial time from the High Court to the SC on a preliminary point that was long settled.
Re-emphasising the centrality of stare decisis to the administration of justice, Abiru, J.S.C., reiterated that decisions of the SC are binding on all courts, including the SC itself. His Lordship warned that future instances of such intransigence may attract sanctions, and he dismissed the appeal as wholly devoid of merit, affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Commentary on the Decision
This decision reaffirms the SC’s steadfast commitment to the doctrine of judicial precedent as one of the fulcrums of Nigeria’s justice system. The Court underscored that fidelity to precedent is indispensable to the predictability and coherence of judicial decisions, which in turn sustains public confidence in the rule of law and the institutional integrity of the courts. By censuring the trial court’s disregard of binding authorities, the decision reiterates that the judicial hierarchy is not advisory but obligatory.
The Court’s reasoning draws strength from its earlier pronouncement in Esuwoye v. Bosere & Ors. [2017] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1546) 256, where it held that a cause of action in chieftaincy disputes only accrues when the relevant Edit is invoked to fill a vacancy, not when the Edit itself is made. That settled position consistent with Ikine v. Edjerode [2001] 18 NWLR (Pt. 745) 446, was binding on the trial court. Its departure from those authorities, despite their being cited before it, exemplified what the SC aptly described as “judicial impertinence and judicial rascality.”
The decision also resonates with the Court’s pronouncements in Oni v. Governor, Ekiti State [2019] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1664) 1 and Dahiru v. A.P.C. [2017] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1555) 218, which consistently affirm that the doctrine of stare decisis admits no discretion. Its observance is mandatory. Certainty and consistency are the essence of judicial precedents, and any deliberate departure from settled law erodes the judiciary’s credibility as an impartial arbiter.
Significantly, the SC’s warning in this case moves beyond mere admonition. It signals that persistent defiance of binding authority by trial courts or counsel may, going forward, attract disciplinary sanction. The decision, therefore, stands as both a reaffirmation of judicial discipline and a cautionary marker for the bench and bar that fidelity to precedent is not optional; it is the very condition of an ordered and credible system of justice.